Alert · reviewed · open
Transaction Risk Skoor 40 (review band) on a $692.99 ach transfer: returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized.
- Detector
- skoor_review
- Severity
- medium
- Program
- Harbor Marketplace Payouts (simulated)
- Subject
- transfer acht_sim_harb_augndnlr62c
- Transfer
- acht_sim_harb_augndnlr62c · $692.99 · ach outgoing
- Skoor at alert
- 40 review
- Hard signal
- no
- Policy
- policy-v1
- Opened
- 2026-09-17 19:30Z
- Closed
- —
- Decision clock
- none · due — no clock
- Escalated
- —
Draft narrative
What happened. Alert 478da11b-4271-401f-9f39-95a3f303510c fired on an outgoing ACH transfer (acht_sim_harb_augndnlr62c, $692.99) under the Harbor Marketplace Payouts program. The transfer risk score was 40, placing it in the review band, driven by a single signal: the counterparty has 2 prior unauthorized returns.
What the evidence shows. The transfer is already SETTLED with return code none, so no funds are currently in transit or held. The originating entity, Alder Co 112, is VERIFIED, not high risk, not PEP, with no review reasons and a recent screening date (2026-06-29). The one signal driving the score is returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized, weighted 40, based on 2 prior unauthorized returns tied to counterparty cpty_sim_harb_gzii64r41f, whose country is unknown. Confidence on the transfer skoor is 1 with n=781. At the program level, two KRIs show breach status: manual_review_aging_hours (1438.03 hours, n=5) and ach_unauthorized_return_rate (0.00847, n=236). Two more KRIs are at watch: pep_flagged_entities (1 of 30) and high_risk_entity_share (0.0667). All other KRIs are ok or unmeasured. There are no prior dispositions on this alert.
What was checked. Reviewed the alert evidence, the transfer record and its status, the entity verification profile, and the program KRI snapshot. Confirmed the transfer already settled with no return code, so no transfer is held pending release. Checked whether the entity itself carries independent risk markers (high risk, PEP, stale screening) and found none. Checked whether the driving signal is corroborated at the program level and found two related KRIs (unauthorized return rate, manual review aging) in breach.
What is recommended. This transfer is settled with no return, so there is nothing to hold or release on this alert. The originating entity is clean on verification and screening. However, the counterparty's repeat unauthorized-return history, combined with program-level breaches in unauthorized return rate and manual review aging, points to a pattern extending beyond this single transaction. A person should review counterparty cpty_sim_harb_gzii64r41f across the portfolio and the program's aging manual-review backlog rather than treat this as a one-off closure.
- Recommendation
- escalate
- Confidence
- 0.55
- Model
- claude-sonnet-5
- Drafted
- 2026-09-17 19:31Z
- Rationale
- Transfer acht_sim_harb_augndnlr62c is SETTLED with return code none; no funds are held, so release/hold on this transfer is not applicable.
- The sole driving signal (2 prior unauthorized returns on the counterparty) is a repeat-behavior indicator, not a one-time anomaly.
- Program KRI ach_unauthorized_return_rate is in breach (0.00847, n=236), and manual_review_aging_hours is in breach (1438 hours, n=5), suggesting review capacity and unauthorized-return issues extend beyond this single alert.
- The originating entity (Alder Co 112) is verified, not high risk, not PEP, and recently screened, so the concern centers on the counterparty rather than the entity.
- Counterparty country is unknown, which limits full assessment and supports escalation rather than close.
- No prior dispositions exist to indicate this pattern has already been reviewed.
Evidence
{
"n": 781,
"band": "review",
"skoor": 40,
"signals": [
{
"code": "returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized",
"detail": "2 prior unauthorized return(s)",
"weight": 40
}
],
"confidence": 1,
"routeReason": "detector not auto-closable"
}
Skoor signals
| Signal | Weight | Hard | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized | +40 | 2 prior unauthorized return(s) |
Decision
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Dispositions
No disposition yet.
Actions
Freeze, request to program, and suspend need a second, distinct approver. Clear hold, cancel, and pause execute on the requester's approval. Executed through the bank's own API with the tenant's sandbox key; a dry run when there is none.
No actions requested.