Alert · reviewed · open
Transaction Risk Skoor 40 (review band) on a $1,783.79 ach transfer: returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized.
- Detector
- skoor_review
- Severity
- medium
- Program
- Lantern Lending (simulated)
- Subject
- transfer acht_sim_lant_bvs3pqjqdxg
- Transfer
- acht_sim_lant_bvs3pqjqdxg · $1,783.79 · ach outgoing
- Skoor at alert
- 40 review
- Hard signal
- no
- Policy
- policy-v1
- Opened
- 2026-09-17 19:31Z
- Closed
- —
- Decision clock
- none · due — no clock
- Escalated
- —
Draft narrative
What happened. An ACH outgoing credit transfer of $1,783.79 from entity Fern Studio 35 (program Lantern Lending) was flagged by the skoor_review detector at a Transaction Risk Skoor of 40, placing it in the review band. The triggering signal is one prior unauthorized return associated with the counterparty.
What the evidence shows. The transfer has already settled with no return code on this transaction itself. The single signal driving the score is a historical unauthorized return tied to counterparty cpty_sim_lant_asr3v7ggcjp, weighted at 40, which is the full score. The entity Fern Studio 35 is verified, not high risk, not PEP, with no open review reasons and screening current as of 2026-08-12. Program-level KRIs show ach_unauthorized_return_rate at 0 (n=190) and ach_overall_return_rate at 0.0105 (n=190), both in the ok range, indicating this pattern is not elevated at the program level. Manual_review_aging_hours is in breach (1433.6 hours, n=5) and hold_aging_hours is at watch (1406.4 hours, n=2), which reflect review queue timeliness rather than this specific transfer. There are no prior dispositions on this alert.
What was checked. Transfer status and return code, counterparty and entity verification status, program-level KRIs for return rates and concentration, and prior disposition history. No hard signal was present (hard_signal: false), and confidence on the detector's evidence is 0.82.
What is recommended. This transfer has already settled, so no funds can be held on it. A person should review the counterparty's prior unauthorized return history before this counterparty is used again, but there is no basis in the evidence to treat this as an active risk requiring escalation beyond this single alert, since program-level unauthorized and overall return rates are within normal range. Recommend closing this alert with a note to monitor the counterparty for repeat unauthorized returns.
- Recommendation
- close
- Confidence
- 0.62
- Model
- claude-sonnet-5
- Drafted
- 2026-09-17 19:31Z
- Rationale
- Transfer status is SETTLED with return code none, so this specific transaction shows no current unauthorized return.
- The sole signal is one prior unauthorized return tied to the counterparty, not a pattern across program KRIs (ach_unauthorized_return_rate=0, n=190).
- Entity is verified, not high risk, not PEP, with no open review reasons and recent screening.
- No prior dispositions exist to indicate an ongoing pattern for this alert.
- Because the transfer already settled, a hold or release recommendation does not apply.
- Confidence is moderate rather than high because the counterparty's country is unknown and only one data point (n=1 prior return) supports the signal.
Evidence
{
"n": 552,
"band": "review",
"skoor": 40,
"signals": [
{
"code": "returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized",
"detail": "1 prior unauthorized return(s)",
"weight": 40
}
],
"confidence": 0.82,
"routeReason": "detector not auto-closable"
}
Skoor signals
| Signal | Weight | Hard | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| returns.counterparty_prior_unauthorized | +40 | 1 prior unauthorized return(s) |
Decision
Sign in as an operator to decide. Operator sign-in →
Dispositions
No disposition yet.
Actions
Freeze, request to program, and suspend need a second, distinct approver. Clear hold, cancel, and pause execute on the requester's approval. Executed through the bank's own API with the tenant's sandbox key; a dry run when there is none.
No actions requested.